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American Judicial Rejectionism and the Domestic 
Court’s Undermining of International Human Rights 
Law and Policy After Human Right Violations Have 
Occurred in the State 
Jessika L. Gonzalez† 
 Abstract:  Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd’s 
executions ignited protests across the world. These protests raised debate over 
the United States Supreme Court’s creation of qualified immunity for police 
misconduct. This in turn creates an appropriate opportunity to stop and take 
stock of United States law surrounding protections and immunities afforded to 
law enforcement officials, relative to international law and policy on law 
enforcement accountability and oversight. In doing so, this article uncovers how 
the American judiciary carries out a new form of American rejectionism 
powered by its use of qualified immunity doctrine, which in practice, results in 
a lack of accountability for law enforcement officials. This effectively 
undermines international human rights law ratified by the State such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT), and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Form of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The State judiciary’s exercise of 
qualified immunity doctrine also dismisses international policy developed by 
international organizations like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). The issue is unsettling for two reasons: (1) it effectively nullifies 
the treaty making process and (2) perpetuates a system where domestic courts 
are not accountable to international law ratified and enforced by the nation’s 
other two branches of government. This article proposes a new approach to this 
area of the law: reforming Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations 
(RUDs) so as to not limit treaties’ domestic effect within the State’s judicial 
system and instilling within it greater and more principled acceptance of 
international legal norms. 
Cite as: Jessika L. Gonzalez, American Judicial Rejectionism and the 
Domestic Court’s Undermining of International Human Rights Law and Policy 
After Human Right Violations Have Occurred in the State, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 
397 (2021). 
INTRODUCTION 
The execution of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George 
Floyd has inspired people across the globe to call attention to laws that 
have consistently protected law enforcement officials and authorized 
them to act with absolute impunity. Such laws appropriately examined 
in this context have included the United States Supreme Court’s creation 
of qualified immunity for police misconduct.1 In examining for the first 
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time how United States’ law surrounding protections and immunities 
afforded to law enforcement officials square with international law and 
policy on law enforcement accountability and oversight, this article 
uncovers how the United States’ highest court carries out an explicit 
form of American rejectionism powered by and through the continual 
use of the qualified immunity doctrine.  
Internationally prescribed law and policy is undermined or 
rejected when judiciaries—like in the United States—develop legal 
doctrines akin to that of qualified immunity. The doctrine protects a law 
enforcement official from being held personally liable for human rights 
violations, so long as the official does not violate clearly established law. 
This in turn allows police officers to escape accountability. 
International human rights law ratified by the United States sets 
out legal standards on the fundamental rights entitled to individuals in 
the context of policing. Practical guidance is also developed by 
international organizations to support States,2 like the United States, in 
an endeavor to provide transparency, accountability, and police 
oversight, through disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement 
officials. Despite these legal obligations and guidance, the United States’ 
Supreme Court stays firm and determined in their dismissal of 
international law and policy. This attitude threatens to delegitimize the 
treaty making process and perpetuates a system where State domestic 
court systems are not accountable to international law ratified by the 
State where the domestic courts sit. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief 
introduction to the qualified immunity doctrine, following its evolution 
before discussing how its evolved presence in the United States today 
results in a lack of accountability for law enforcement officials. Part II 
unpacks three international treaties undermined by the qualified 
immunity doctrine, while also discussing international standards that 
detail and put forth guidance for a more transparent and accountable 
State policing model. Part III illustrates how the United States’ qualified 
immunity doctrine undermines international law and policy and explains 
why this is of notable importance. A brief Part IV recommends solutions 
to improve the United States’ domestic court policy on this front. Among 
these solutions are reforming Reservations, Understandings, and 
Declarations (“RUDs”) so as to not restrict the domestic effect treaties 
 
would also like to thank the Editorial Staff at Washington International Law Journal for 
their hard work, insightful comments, and incredible attention to detail, especially Sean 
Hyde, Kolby Cameron, and Katrina Mendoza. 
1  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
2  For the purposes of this article, “State” refers to a sovereign whose citizens are 
relatively homogenous. 
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have within the State court system, and instilling within the State, greater 
and more principled acceptance of international legal norms. 
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
To understand why the United States’ judiciary’s use of 
qualified immunity undermines international law, one must first 
understand: (a) what qualified immunity is, and (b) how the doctrine’s 
expansion over time results in decreased accountability and oversight for 
law enforcement. These understandings bring larger arguments about the 
undermining of international law and policy into focus. 
A. Qualified Immunity as a Law Enforcement Official Legal Defense to 
Standing Civil Trial 
“Qualified immunity is a defense to standing civil trial” as a law 
enforcement official.3 When granted, officials exercising discretionary 
functions are given immunity from civil suit in cases dealing with 
statutory or constitutional rights violations.4 Law enforcement officials 
can raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense at all times when 
their actions do not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”5 The doctrine 
affords “government officials a ‘margin of error’ to make mistakes in the 
course of their work.”6 It also protects their “judgment calls made in a 
legally uncertain environment,”7 and intends to protect “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”8  
 
3  Tim Miller, Part IX Qualified Immunity, FLETC, 
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/PartIXQualifiedImmunity.pdf. 
4  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 
233 (7th Cir. 2017); Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Liff v. 
Office of Inspector Gen. for U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 881 F.3d 912, 917–18 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(noting that qualified immunity is an entitlement given by the court to not have to stand 
trial or face other burdens of litigation); WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
LSB10492, POLICING THE POLICE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
CONGRESS (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10492. 
5  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
6  Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2017). 
7  Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995). 
8  Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 341 (1986)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (quoting Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d 
1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1994 (11th Cir. 
2002)); West Virginia State Police v. Hughes, 238 W. Va. 406, 411 (2017) (quoting Malley 
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); see also Andrea M. Alonso & Kenneth E. Pitcoff, A 
Closer Look at Qualified Immunity, N.Y. L.J. (Jul. 23, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.la
w.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/07/23/a-closer-look-at-qualified-immunity/ (explaining 
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B. The Doctrine’s Jurisprudence Results in a Lack of Accountability for 
Law Enforcement Officials 
Qualified immunity’s evolution over time led to a lack of 
accountability for law enforcement officials. This development began 
when the Court wished to clarify causes of actions that could be made 
against government officials under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, and its 
statutory cause of action, Section 1983.9 The statute and its statutory 
cause of action provided people with an avenue to file suit for the 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws” by persons acting “under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.”10 
When that person happened to be a law enforcement official, Section 
1983, as written by the Congress, allowed civil legal remedies for 
individuals to seek legal redress for human right violations recognized 
under the Constitution.11 This included the “right to be free from 
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment[,]” for example.12 Indeed, 
Section 1983 is seen as a “vital component” to redeeming constitutional 
guarantees for two reasons.13 Criminal prosecutions of police officers are 
scarce, so a plaintiff’s “most plausible avenue for redress [is] often a civil 
suit for monetary damages.”14 It also provides a plaintiff with another 
avenue for redressability. 
Pierson v. Ray was the first time the Court sought to clarify 
what causes of action could be made under Section 1983.15 Pierson 
involved an action against city officers and municipal police for false 
arrest, imprisonment, and damages for the deprivation of the petitioner’s 
civil rights.16 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren expanded 
the defense of good faith and probable cause, initially available to 
officers in common-law actions for false arrest and imprisonment, to 
 
qualified immunity is not a catchall, and that “it is available to all government officials 
except those officers who, on an objective basis, are either ‘plainly incompetent’ or 
‘knowingly violates the law.”). 
9  NOVAK, supra note 4, at 2. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 4; see also Fourth Amendment, CORNELL LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2021) (noting that all searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment 
must be reasonable, and that no excessive force shall be used). 
13  NOVAK, supra note 4, at 2. 
14  Marcus R. Nemeth, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development 
of the Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. 
REV. 989, 991–92 (2019). 
15  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 551 (1967). 
16  Id. at 548–50. 
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actions under Section 1983.17 The Court clarified that because there was 
no legislative record indicating an intent to abolish such immunities, the 
“principle of law” establishing immunities for law enforcement officials, 
had not been abolished by Section 1983’s creation.18  
Over time, these officer protections expanded.19 Whereas the 
Court in Pierson had initially found that qualified immunity applied in 
instances where police officers exhibited “good faith” and “probable 
cause,” the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald enlarged the standard by 
requiring that there be “clearly established” law for the types of 
violations committed, to overcome such immunities.20 The Court 
reasoned that there should be balance between “the importance of a 
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens” with “the need to 
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official 
authority.”21 The Court clarified that its purpose for reaching such 
conclusions was to allow “officials to do their jobs and to exercise 
judgment, wisdom and sense without worry of being sued.”22 Thus, the 
test we see today for qualified immunity was born: when government 
officials’ conduct does not amount to a violation of “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights” that a reasonable person would have 
known, they are entitled to qualified immunity.23  
The doctrine’s expansion serves as a barrier for holding law 
enforcement officials accountable because the legal standard, since 
Pierson and its progenies, made it more difficult to bring claims against 
law enforcement officials as a civil plaintiff.24 The difficulty arises 
because the legal standard requires a civil plaintiff to identify not only a 
 
17  Id. at 557. 
18  Id. at 554. 
19  Nimra Azmi, The Supreme Court’s Insidious Development of Qualified 
Immunity, JUST SECURITY (June 12, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70751/the-
supreme-courts-insidious-development-of-qualified-immunity/ (explaining how since its 
inception, “qualified immunity’s protections for officers have only expanded” and that the 
doctrine has since grown “as a barrier to justice in . . . intertwined ways.”) 
20  Id. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
21  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
22  West Virginia Lottery v. A-1 Amusement, Inc., 807 S.E.2d 760, 776 (2017) 
(quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 783 S.E.2d 75, 82 (2015)). 
23  Id. See also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (holding that 
qualified immunity protects police from civil suit as long as their actions do not “violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”); Nemeth, supra note 14, at 998–99. 
24  See Azmi, supra note 19; see JAY SCHEWEIKERT, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY 
ANALYSIS NO. 901, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: A LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND MORAL FAILURE 
(Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-09/pa-901-update.pdf 
(strongly indicating that the qualified immunity doctrine’s expansion has resulted in a lack 
of accountability for law enforcement officials due to its legal standard). 
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“clear legal rule[,] but a prior case” with identical facts.25 Civil plaintiffs 
struggle to show that the law or right was clearly established at the time 
the violation was committed.26 This conundrum is due to the United 
States’ Supreme Court having not yet clearly defined what it means for 
a right to have been “clearly established.”27 Specifically, the doctrine 
remains unclear “with respect to the nature of authority required to find 
a clearly established right.”28 Instead of providing guidance, the Court 
provides vague generalities that “existing precedent should place the 
constitutional question ‘beyond debate.’”29 
When the Court does provide some guidance, it has been 
contradictory.30 At times, the Court paid little attention to the sources of 
law, and instead focused on how specifically the right had been 
defined.31 In these cases, the Court held that the right must be defined 
with enough clarity that a reasonable official would know that what he 
or she is doing violated a right.32 At other times, the Court stated that the 
facts of a prior case need not be “materially similar,” and that although 
the exact action in question does not have to be proved unlawful, prior 
existing law should make the unlawfulness of an action apparent.33 Thus, 
the degree “to which the specific facts of the violation need to match 
 
25  SCHEWEIKERT, supra note 24 (noting that in practice, the legal standard is a 
“huge hurdle for civil plaintiffs because it generally requires them to identify not just a 
clear legal rule, but a prior case with functionally identical facts”). 
26  James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional 
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602–03 (2011) (stating 
that the lack of accountability stems from the inability to meet such a demanding standard 
to overcome such immunities awarded to law enforcement officials). 
27  Id. John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 
1298–99 (2012) (describing how the Supreme Court has not given a definition of what it 
means for rights to have been “clearly established”). 
28  Tyler Finn, Qualified Immunity Formalism: ‘Clearly Established Law’ and the 
Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 450 (2019). 
29  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (holding that plaintiffs seeking 
to overcome qualified immunity are required to present “existing precedent” that places 
the legal question “beyond debate”); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015); 
Finn supra note 28, at 450. 
30  Williams, supra note 27, at 1305. 
31  Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2018) (clarifying that lower courts 
should not read precedent broadly when determining if new facts should be governed by 
clearly established law); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (noting 
that whether facts fall into the “clearly established” standard requires a “high ‘degree of 
specificity’”); see Finn supra note 28, at 451 (explaining how the “Supreme Court has 
concentrated little attention on the relevant sources of law, instead focusing its holding on 
the specificity with which the right must be defined”). 
32  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741; see Finn 
supra note 28, at 451 (emphasizing how the Supreme Court has looked for the invoked 
right to have been “defined with sufficient clarity so a reasonable official would understand 
that what she is doing violates that right”). 
33  Finn, supra note 28, at 452. 
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existing precedent” is unclear.34 The inconsistency is problematic 
because it continues to present difficulties for lower courts who are 
responsible for initially determining what “clearly established” law is for 
rights.35 This, in turn, results in an ambiguous standard. 
Because of the lack of clarity in the standard, the doctrine in 
practice protects law enforcement officials from even getting to trial.36 
Judges, in their “arbitrary degree of factual specificity in making that 
judgment . . . ultimately leave the protections afforded by important 
rights unpredictable”37 and err on the side of granting rather than denying 
qualified immunity. In other words, the expansive judicial discretion 
self-created by the decreased uniformity of qualified immunity rulings 
results in more protections for police and decreased protections for 
plaintiffs whose rights have been violated.38 Moreover, deciding cases in 
this discretionary way leaves certain constitutional analysis unaddressed, 
which means the law is never left clear, never grows, and stalls.39 This 
stalling leaves civil plaintiffs without a remedy for the violation of their 
rights.40 As Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion notes in Kisela, this 
approach towards qualified immunity “transforms the doctrine into an 
absolute shield for law enforcement officers” and is “symptomatic of ‘a 
disturbing trend regarding the use of the Court’s resources’ in qualified 
immunity cases.”41 Indeed, a Reuters study confirms not only the 
growing inclination of the appellate courts to grant police immunity but 
also large geographical disparities in the rate that officers receive 
immunity.42  
 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  See Nemeth, supra note 14, at 992. 
37  Aaron Belzer, The Audacity of Ignoring Hope: How the Existing Qualified 
Immunity Analysis Leads to Unremedied Rights, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 647, 647 (2012). 
38  Williams, supra note 27, at 1299; Belzer, supra note 37. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
42  Reuter’s analysis found notable distinctions in how district court judges in two 
different states ruled on qualified immunity requests. For instance, Texas judges granted 
immunity more frequently to officers who used force against unarmed civilians than 
California judges did in cases where civilians were armed. Andrea Januta & Jackie Botts, 
Taking the Measure of Qualified Immunity: How Reuters Analyzed the Data, REUTERS 
(Dec. 23, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
police-immunity-methodology/. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS ON 
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
The ICCPR, the UNCAT, and the ICERD, set out legal 
standards applicable to both policing and the fundamental rights of an 
individual for States to observe. In addition, practical guidance 
developed by international organizations—like the UNODC—is given 
to support States like the United States, in an endeavor to provide 
transparency, accountability, and oversight in policing, as specific to 
disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement officials. To better 
understand the drawn connection, one need first know what the 
aforementioned treaties represent and the United States’ role in the 
treaties. Similarly, practical guidance as carried out by UNODC must 
first be illustrated in order to bring forth the connection that this article 
presents.  
A. International Legal Obligations Under the ICCPR, UNCAT, 
and the ICERD 
In the international human rights arena, there are three treaties 
of notable importance that set out guiding principles on the fundamental 
rights of a person for ratifying States to observe and that are particularly 
undermined by the U.S. judiciary’s creation and practice of the qualified 
immunity doctrine: the ICCPR,43 the UNCAT,44 and the ICERD.45 
Subject to RUDs,46 ratifying States are bound by the respective treaty 
provisions.47 
1. The ICCPR Guarantees Right to Effective Remedy for Civil 
Rights Violations. — The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the 
United Nations Assembly that commits its parties to respect an 
individual’s civil and political rights, including the right to life, human 
dignity, and freedom from torture.48 Imbedded into the treaty is the 
 
43  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
44  G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture (Dec. 10, 1984). 
45  G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965). 
46  RUDs are attachments to treaties that explain how a treaty will be interpreted 
with a State’s domestic law once ratification is complete. RUDs limit the domestic effect 
of treaties and reframe certain provisions from the treaties in ways that make it consistent 
with American practices. Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of 
Treaty Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170, 170 (2016). 
47  The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States sets 
out basic principles of how customary law should be incorporated into the “law of the land” 
under Article IV of the Constitution. As the Court holds, “international law is part of our 
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
48  G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 43, pmbl. 
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guaranteed right to due process and a fair trial when those rights have 
been violated.49  
The ICCPR establishes an international legal framework for a 
right to remedy, wherein the covenant compels ratifying State 
governments to take judicial measures in order to protect the rights 
afforded in the treaty provisions and allows for effective remedies to 
ensue.50 As stated more specifically in the ICCPR, ratifying States need 
to have an adequate process in place, by which people can seek redress 
if their civil or political rights have been violated.51 Notably, each State 
Party shoulders a burden: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms 
as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy 
shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislature authorities, or by 
any other competent authority provided for by the 
legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted.52 
In 1992, the United States Senate ratified the ICCPR.53 As a result, the 
ICCPR effectively became the “supreme law of the land” and now 
carries the weight of federal law in the United States.54 In carrying this 
status, the ICCPR obligates the United States to protect basic human 
rights including in instances where government entities and agents are 
involved.55 To that end, the covenant compels the United States’ 
government to take judicial measures towards protecting the rights listed 
in the treaty’s provisions and to provide an effective remedy when those 
 
49  Id. pt. 2, art. 2. 
50  FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, ACLU (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr. 
51  U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT, AND INTEGRITY, at 21, U.N. Sales No. E.11.IV.5 (2011), 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_police_Accountability_Overs
ight_and_Integrity.pdf. 
52  G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 43, pt. 2, art. 2, ¶ 3. 
53  ACLU, supra note 50. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
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rights have been violated.56 Subject to RUDs made at the time of 
ratifying the ICCPR, the United States cannot take measures that 
contradict or violate such provisions.57 
Here, it is important to note that at the time of U.S. ratification 
of the ICCPR, there was a RUD rendering the treaty non-self-
executing.58 This RUD, in effect, limits litigants’ ability to sue in court 
for direct enforcement of the treaty provisions.59 Despite this, the United 
States is still obligated to uphold the object and purpose of the ratified 
treaty.60 
2. Right to Prompt and Impartial Investigations, and Fair and 
Adequate Compensation under the UNCAT. — The UNCAT is a human 
rights treaty with the objective to help eliminate cruel, inhumane 
treatment across the international community.61 This treaty is applicable 
to policing, specifically in terms of policing behavior (like torture).62 
UNCAT requires its signatories to take effective measures to avoid 
torture and other acts of cruel or inhuman treatment within their 
jurisdiction.63 Upon the State’s ratification, it must ensure that when 
there is inhumane treatment in violation of the treaty’s provisions, it is 
made possible for an individual to initiate and proceed with a prompt and 
impartial investigation in the State.64 Specifically, Article 12 and 13 
obligate the ratifying State to ensure competent authorities promptly and 
impartially investigate, when there is reasonable belief that an act of 
torture has occurred in its jurisdiction.65 Article 14 obligates the State 
party to ensure redress in its legal system for an act of torture.66 This 
includes providing “an enforceable right to fair and adequate 
compensation” and in the event of the victim’s death “as a result of 
torture, his [or her] dependents shall be entitled to compensation.”67 
Upon United States ratification in October 1994, the UNCAT 
became binding in the United States, consequentially expanding its 
 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  S. Res. 95-20, 102d Cong., 138 Cong. Rec. S478-01 (1992) (enacted). 
59  ACLU, supra note 50. 
60  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (A “State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty”). 
61  U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to 
Interrogation, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM (Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
reports/RL32438.html. 
62  U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 51, at 21. 
63  G.A. Res. 39/46, supra note 44. 
64  Id. arts. 12–13. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. art. 14. 
67  Id. 
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application to all actions in the State, notably, actions involving 
“government entities and agents,” down to the state and local level.68 In 
effect, the Convention applies to police departments and other law 
enforcement agencies.69 Though, in similar fashion to the ICCPR, the 
United States Senate, at the time of ratification, submitted a declaration, 
rendering the previously mentioned treaty provisions non-self-
executing.70  
3. The Ratifying State’s Obligation to Review Governmental 
Policies that Perpetuate Racial Discrimination under ICERD. — The 
ICERD is a convention that commits its signatories to the elimination of 
racial discrimination and sets forth principles by which signatories can 
work to eliminate racial discrimination.71 Notably, State parties 
guarantee that they will “take effective measures to review 
governmental, national, and local policies, and amend, rescind, or nullify 
any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or 
perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.”72 Moreover, State 
parties shall ensure to those in their jurisdiction effective remedy 
procedures.73 
Upon ratification of the ICERD in 1994, the United States 
committed itself to upholding equality and non-discrimination in the 
criminal legal system, and access to justice.74 Similar to the ICCPR and 
UNCAT, the ICERD provisions apply to “government entities and 
agents, including all federal, state, city, and county and all forms of local 
government entities” in the United States.75 Further, the ICERD carries 
the same weight as federal law, subject to RUDs filed at the time of 
ratification.76 Similar to the RUDs filed upon the ratification of the 
ICCPR and UNCAT, the United States declared the ICERD treaty to be 
 
68  FAQ: The Convention Against Torture, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-convention-against-torture. 
69  Id. 
70  S. Res. 100-20, 101st Cong., 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (1990) (enacted). 
71  G.A. Res. 2106, supra note 45. 
72  Id. art. 2, pt. 1(c). 
73  Id. art. 6. 
74  The United States commits itself to upholding ICERD’s treaty provisions upon 
ratification. Though, the State has fallen short due to nullifying RUDs. Maya K. Watson, 
The United States’ Hollow Commitment to Eradicating Global Racial Discrimination, AM. 
B. ASS’N (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_ri
ghts_magazine_home/black-to-the-future-part-ii/the-united-states--hollow-commitment-
to-eradicating-global-racia/.  
75  Frequently Asked Questions Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ce
rd_faqs.pdf (last visited Feb 19, 2021). 
76  Id.  
408 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 30 NO. 2 
non-self-executing upon ratification.77 In the same vein, this prevents 
litigants from bringing ICERD claims into U.S. courts.78 
B. International Policies on Police Accountability 
In the policing arena, the United Nations has been anything but 
silent about the need for criminal legal system reform. Notably, the 
United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights led efforts to 
address systemic racism against African American individuals by 
adopting resolutions to condemn racial discrimination and violent 
practice at the hands of law enforcement.79 Moreover, throughout the 
years, the United Nations and other international organizations created 
standards for countries to use as a way to hold police officers more 
accountable in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated against 
them. The intention is to assist policymakers and key players within the 
State in helping to improve, promote and protect human rights at the 
domestic level.80 In the context of policing, these sort of standards, 
guidelines, and norms projected by the international community serve as 
readymade tools for States across the globe by which accountability can 
be reinforced in their jurisdictions.81  
1. International Standards and Practices Specific to 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Police Officers. — At its core, 
international norms involving disciplinary proceedings against police 
officers communicate a need for States to respect and protect human 
rights. Narrowing into what exactly this entails, State police overseers 
have to be willing to hold police accountable. With this form of 
accountability “disrespect must be followed by appropriate disciplinary 
proceedings.”82 In other words, there must be a willingness to provide 
individuals with certain protections, which include disciplinary 
proceedings when violations have occurred. Specifically, these 
proceedings should not be limited to criminal proceedings, but should 
include both “civil and public administrative proceedings for 
compensation or redress.”83 Notably, international standards for policing 
include the ability for a fair trial to be conducted, where there is the 
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“disclosing [of] dockets and other pieces of work-related information 
that may be self-incriminating.”84 In situations where “the complainant 
is injured, or the victim has died as a result of police action, the burden 
of proof falls on the police to explain” how this happened.85  
This becomes especially important in the context of policing 
where “successful civil suits filed by victims [become] a critical tool for 
police departments to identify and remedy widespread abuses” in a way 
that criminal charges against police officers cannot.86 Indeed, the 
UNODC emphasized the usefulness of a complainant filing a civil suit 
against the police officer or police agency accused of misconduct.87 
UNODC reasoned that it is a better accountability mechanism than 
existing police accountability systems, as civil litigation is historically a 
strong deterrent against future violations.88 
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE UNDERMINES INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLICY, COMPROMISING ACCOUNTABILITY 
Despite the law and policy put into place by the international 
community, the United States judicially created qualified immunity 
doctrine for law enforcement officials undermines the measures meant 
to secure law enforcement accountability. Although domestic courts in 
the State are not obligated to enforce treaties that are bound to non-self-
executing RUDs or pay mind to what the international community offers 
as “advice” about domestic affairs,89 creating this form of domestic court 
precedent poses bigger challenges to the treaty making process’s 
legitimacy and it feeds into a system wherein State domestic court 
systems are held less accountable to treaties the State itself ratified.  
A. The Lack of Clarity Found in the Doctrine Undermines International 
Law and Policy. 
As discussed in Part I, the highest court in the United States has 
never given a clear definition of what it means for a right to be “clearly 
established,”90 which has resulted in a lack of accountability for law 
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enforcement officials.91 This lack of accountability, whether intentional 
or not, undermines and rejects international law and policy that requires 
a State to hold law enforcement officials accountable after a human 
rights violation occurs in its territory.  
The ICCPR provides for an individual’s right to effective 
remedy after a civil or political rights violation occurs in the ratifying 
State.92 However, a State domestic court system undermines such State 
obligations when it creates doctrines like qualified immunity, which 
compromises the State’s obligation of “ensur[ing] that any person whose 
civil rights or freedoms are violated[,] have an effective remedy,” and 
that said remedy is guaranteed and enforced by judicial authorities.93 
Although the ICCPR does not explicitly consider civil legal redress to be 
a sign of ensuring effective remedy, it is arguable that not having civil 
legal redress in the United States compromises remedies’ adequacy and 
effectiveness. In the United States, police officer criminal prosecutions 
are scarce and a plaintiff’s “most plausible avenue for redress often is 
civil suit for monetary damages.”94 Thus, by limiting avenues for civil 
remedy as a result of the difficult standard that must be met to surpass 
qualified immunity, there are functionally no options in remedy. 
Similarly, the qualified immunity doctrine undermines 
provisions under the UNCAT that guarantee an individual’s right to 
prompt and impartial investigations, and fair and adequate compensation 
in the United States when acts of cruel, inhuman treatment are exhibited 
by law enforcement officials.95 There is a lack of prompt and impartial 
investigations when a State domestic court doctrine limits the ability for 
an officer to even stand civil suit in the first place. This practice hinders 
both the ability to promptly redress violations against victims and 
judicial impartiality, by wielding vague legal standards to dismiss a civil 
case without having to analyze its implications. Moreover, the qualified 
immunity doctrine rejects much of the language in Article 14 which 
ensures that ratifying States provide redress for an act of torture and that 
a plaintiff have an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.96 
This is because the doctrine’s application limits the ability to seek civil 
damages against officers who may have exercised cruel and inhuman 
treatment against an individual. 
The doctrine also undermines ICERD provisions that speak to 
amending, rescinding or nullifying laws that have the effect of creating 
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or perpetuating racial discrimination.97 The doctrine in itself perpetuates 
egregious and racist conduct exercised by police officers because its 
standard makes it almost impossible to sue a police officer for damages.98  
In short, international standards and practice specific to 
disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement officials are also 
undermined when State domestic court doctrine ignores the need for civil 
suits and standards in disciplinary proceedings. 
As noted in Part II, international organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UNODC 
suggest that there be civil proceedings for redress because of civil 
litigation’s ability to serve as a strong deterrent against future 
violations.99 Civil suits serve as a uniquely strong deterrent for a few 
reasons. First, litigation through Section 1983 tends to be “the only legal 
tool that is available to reach the nearly 18,000 police departments 
nationwide.”100 Second, civil suits against police officers are vital 
because modern discovery allows for information accumulation that can 
then be assessed “for trends . . . suggesting problem officers, units and 
practices.”101 In the same way, one could also review evidence developed 
through case law “for personnel and policy lessons.”102 
However, the qualified immunity doctrine undermines these 
processes by preventing cases from ever coming to court. As a result, the 
doctrine’s limitations do not pay enough attention to international policy 
stressing the importance for civil suits against police officers. Thus, the 
doctrine undermines international standards and norms that call for fair 
trials outside of criminal proceedings against law enforcement 
officials.103 This includes a means for disclosure of self-incriminating 
information,104 an ability for an accurate balancing of evidence,105 and 
the burden falling on the law enforcement officials to explain how the 
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violation might have occurred.106 The U.S. judiciary’s rejectionism in 
this way fails to acknowledge the advice given by international 
organizations, like ICRC and UNODC, that there is value in the ability 
to file civil suit against a law enforcement official. If there were an honest 
acknowledgement of such international policies, the U.S. judiciary 
would not make it so difficult to sue a law enforcement official in a non-
criminal proceeding.  
B. U.S. Rejectionism Delegitimizes the Treaty-making Process, and 
Results in a Lack of Accountability 
As noted, State domestic courts are not obligated to enforce 
treaties that are bound to non-self-executing RUDs,107 nor are States 
obligated to follow advice given by the international community. 
However, this does not stop domestic disregard of international law and 
policy through court precedent from being unimportant. Creating 
domestic court precedent that undermines international law and policy 
delegitimizes the treaty making process and further perpetuates the 
notion that State domestic courts need not give credence to international 
law the State itself ratified. 
Of course, international human rights law must be delicately 
balanced with sovereignty principles, especially in cases where 
sovereignty principles are exercised through the State domestic court 
system.108 However, State domestic court rejectionist policy that 
undermines international law meant to combat a lack of accountability 
for law enforcement officials ends up incapacitating treaties the U.S. 
signs and ratifies. International treaties are built on shared interests, trust 
and are meant to promote greater cooperation among States.109 In other 
words, State parties to an international treaty are supposed to have 
greater confidence that the terms to which they have agreed are followed 
by other State parties signing on.110 Therefore, when domestic court 
precedent undermines such provisions, built confidence and trust 
established among signatories is jeopardized. Such undermining also 
presents larger issues regarding the treaty-making process’s legitimacy 
and what it means for there to be international law if such undermining, 
whether intentional or not, is permitted by the State’s branches of 
government. 
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Further, allowing State domestic court systems to create a 
doctrine that rejects or disregards international law feeds into a larger 
problem. Namely, State domestic courts do not have to enforce treaty 
provisions the State itself ratifies due to federalism principles. 
Federalism principles rely on the notion that it is the legislature’s job to 
implement the provisions of the treaty before it may be applied by the 
courts.111 However, what is actually created is a State domestic court 
system that not only reverts to “local and regional human rights norms 
and institutions over international ones,” but also creates precedent that 
undermines international laws that the State opted to be held accountable 
to.112 
IV. RESOLUTIONS 
Recommendations to combat instances where a State domestic 
court system creates doctrine that undermines international law and 
policy include the development of greater and more principled 
acceptance of international human right legal obligations and norms by 
domestic courts. The first specific suggestion broadly considers limiting 
the use of RUDs, so as to not restrict the domestic effect of treaties like 
the ICCPR, the UNCAT, and ICERD within the State court system. The 
second suggestion considers reforming a specific type of RUD: non-self-
executing declarations, so that treaties like the ICCPR, the UNCAT, and 
ICERD can be acknowledged and enforced in domestic courts. A last 
recommendation calls for greater State recognition and integration of 
norms set forth by international communities.  
A. Reforming RUDs to Counteract U.S. Judiciary Rejectionist Policy 
Considering an appropriate use of RUDs is a positive step 
towards limiting cases where the State’s domestic court system may be 
more inclined to create policy that undermines international law, whether 
explicitly or not. 
RUDs lay out how a treaty will be interpreted under a State’s 
laws,113 as they are attachments put on an international treaty that clarify 
how the respective treaty will be interpreted in the ratifying State.114 In 
other words, RUDs are a way for States to qualify their consent to a 
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particular treaty.115 In some ways, they can be seen as a State, at the 
outset, rejecting particular provisions of the treaty and usurping the 
treaty’s law for a State’s domestic needs.116 It also seems to set a tone in 
the tension that exists between State sovereignty and “the notion of 
international order based on law.”117  
In the United States, RUDs are adopted by the Senate when it 
consents to the treaty and are included when the President decides to 
ratify the treaty.118 Due to RUDs’ ability to void States’ obligations under 
provisions within treaties, international law scholars raise the concern 
that RUDs get in the way of “an international order that seeks to 
encourage genuine and full treaty participation” by the State as a 
whole.119 Indeed, supporters of ratification view certain aspects of RUDs 
as warping the treatymaking process under the United States 
Constitution to the point of even reinvigorating the Bricker 
Amendment—which, if adopted, would have wreaked damage on treaty 
power by making all treaties not self-executing.120  
Consequently, RUDs should be limited. Treaty drafters should 
disallow RUDs and instead include no-reservation clauses and/or 
provisions limiting the use of RUDs.121 This would make the State more 
accountable to the obligations listed within the provisions of a treaty. To 
be clear, there are cases where limiting RUDs will not be possible.122 In 
those cases, the United States should not ratify the treaty.123 Instead the 
United States should consider whether or not it should even sign onto 
such a treaty in the first place, and thereby risk violating the “object and 
purpose” of the treaty’s enactment.124 Limiting the broad overuse of 
RUDs may then be able to reorient the tone that the U.S. customarily 
projects when it comes to meaningfully upholding treaty mandates.125 
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More importantly, limiting RUDs in this way might rebuild sentiment 
within the United States government, including the State’s domestic 
court system, when it comes to paying mind to international law and 
policy because the State would only be signing treaties it is truly 
committed to upholding. 
The possibility of limiting RUDs is not so far out of reach. The 
Senate push backed against limiting RUDs, due to the Senate’s obvious 
need to conform international law to the Constitution.126 However, the 
Senate has given consent to treaties that carry RUD limiting provisions 
although clarifying that their approval should “not be construed as 
precedent for such clauses in future agreements.”127 This suggests that 
progress can be made towards limiting the practice of RUDs.  
This article is not denying the possibility that this shift might 
make the United States reconsider signing onto treaties altogether.128 The 
United States has a history of being reluctant participation in multilateral 
treaties, unless significant reservations to the treaty can be attached.129 
Examples include referring back to the ICCPR, UNCAT, and ICERD, 
where the United States attached reservations in all three treaties that 
effectively excluded State’s domestic courts from enforcing the treaty’s 
provisions.130 Additionally, when the United States became a party to the 
ICCPR, the State attached reservations that excluded U.S. obligations 
under the treaty that added to already-existing U.S. law.131 
There is also the possibility that other State actors might 
determine “the United States’ use of RUDs in important treaties more 
inappropriate and its ratification less important.”132 In this case, treaty 
drafters might be more willing to pass treaties with these sorts of 
provisions that limit RUDs and leave “the United States behind in the 
treatymaking process.”133 This means that other members of the 
international community might start creating RUD-limiting treaties that 
prevent the United States from joining if the United States 
“unnecessarily concerns itself with the enforceability of its RUDs.”134 
Indeed, treaties have no sign of slowing anytime soon, and in instances 
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where the United States ratifies less treaties, other states will continue 
signing and ratifying multilateral treaties without the United States.135  
B. Rethinking RUD Non-Self-Executing Declarations 
The United States’ practice of declaring treaties non-self-
executing via RUDs notably contributes to judicial rejectionist policy, as 
non-self-executing declarations mean that legislative action is required 
before it may be applied by the courts.136 Without legislative action then, 
non-self-executing treaties are seen as a way for domestic courts to 
disregard treaties the State itself ratifies, which further perpetuates 
sentiment that United States domestic courts find no need to take human 
rights treaties seriously.137 Most importantly, it allows domestic courts 
to create doctrines that undermines international legal obligations. In 
order to combat or limit such practices non-self-executing declarations 
should be reformed dramatically. 
Notably, non-self-executing declarations are among the most 
important forms of RUDs, largely due to their remarkable ability to 
render human rights treaties unenforceable by domestic courts.138 As 
previously mentioned, this is because these declarations make it so that 
a treaty is only enforceable in State domestic courts if the United States’ 
political branches act to make it so.139 Thus, this sort of RUD alleviates 
domestic courts from obligations tied to the provisions of a given treaty, 
and instead, punts the “task of implementing human rights obligations 
into domestic law” to the other branches of State government.140  
Proponents of such practices cite that political branches have a 
legitimate need in preserving the domestic implementation of such 
treaties, and that the power over the conduct of U.S. foreign relations 
should be left to the political branches.141 However, such propositions 
are one-dimensional since they fail to acknowledge that all branches of 
the United States government should be accountable to internationally 
recognized and binding law and should act accordingly because treaties 
enjoy the benefit of the Supremacy Clause. One cannot be accountable 
to a treaty’s provisions if there is no power to uphold or enforce it. An 
attachment to the treaty’s ratification should not dramatically change it 
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in this way. Instead, domestic courts should be empowered to uphold the 
supreme law of the land, which is what a treaty becomes upon 
ratification. This is important, as all branches should be accountable to 
the law and play an active role in upholding it, not just two of three 
branches of the government. 
Moreover, international law scholars with federalism sympathy 
disregard that when one branch of government fails to act, the other must 
hold that branch accountable. Concerns over judicial activism are 
welcome, but one must also acknowledge the need for judicial oversight 
due to the separation of power principles. Domestic courts must have the 
ability to hold other branches of government accountable should those 
branches decide not to enforce and uphold treaty provisions the State 
itself committed to upholding. To do otherwise risks compromising the 
people’s will, whose rights, as prescribed under treaties, are actively 
violated. Alternatively, one must consider the point of ratifying the treaty 
in the first place.  
C. State Recognition and Integration of International Norms as a 
Means of Combatting Judicial Rejectionism 
A final recommendation calls for wider acceptance of 
international norms and standards put into place by international 
organizations involving domestic affairs, such as policing. In theory, this 
would encourage greater domestic court recognition and aid in curbing 
domestic court precedent that undermines and discredits such standards 
and norms.  
1. What Are International Organizations and Why Are They 
Important? — International organizations serve many functions, 
including gathering information, monitoring trends, delivering services 
and aid, and providing forums for States to work together to achieve 
common objectives.142 Relevant to this discussion, international 
organizations, typically created by treaty,143 involve multiple nations, 
working in “good faith, on issues of common interest.”144 Because the 
scale of problems States face might be too great to confront alone, 
international organizations, such as the UNODC, offer assistance and 
encourage cross-national approaches to action involving domestic issues 
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such as policing.145 Efforts through international organizations create 
systems that bring nations “together in the areas of peace and 
security.”146 This strengthens charity and clears the way for “equitable 
distribution of [international] resources in the world.”147 These resources 
include manuals from experts such as “police officers, members of 
independent oversight bodies, international consultants, human right 
activists, and academics.”148 In the policing arena, these efforts provide 
“a system of internal and external checks and balances” to make sure law 
enforcement officials carry out their duties properly and are held 
responsible when they do not.149  
2. Why listen? — The big question that seems to follow is why 
the United States—specifically the United States judiciary—would want 
to listen, when it already has a tough time listening to loud and articulate 
voices that define problems and potential solutions within its 
jurisdiction. The answer might be that there is more to be gained than 
lost. Specifically, international standards and norms have the ability to 
shift the way the United States judiciary thinks about its own legal 
interpretation, especially with respect to qualified immunity. As 
associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice 
Breyer, notes, “forces of globalism, internationalism, and 
interdependence” and “forces of localism” need not be “antithetical to” 
one another.150 They can coexist, and both can be accounted for.151 As 
Justice Breyer further suggests, “look[ing] beyond [your] own shores” is 
needed “to answer questions of local law,”152 even for questions of local 
law that might involve domestic affairs, such as policing.  
CONCLUSION 
Whether doctrines at the State domestic judicial level can 
continue undermining and rejecting international law and policy remains 
central to the future of treatymaking. The doctrine examined here, 
qualified immunity, has undermined the ICCPR, the UNCAT, the 
ICERD, and international policy by international organizations.  
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The ICCPR does not specifically prescribe civil legal redress as 
an effective remedy that must be met by the ratifying State. However, in 
a State where criminal prosecutions of police officers are scarce, like the 
United States, difficulties to seek civil legal redress compromise the 
treaties provisions guaranteeing an effective remedy for victims.  
Much in the same way, the qualified immunity doctrine also 
undermines provisions under the UNCAT, which guarantee prompt and 
impartial investigations and fair and adequate compensation in the 
ratifying State when law enforcement officials have exercised cruel and 
inhuman treatment against an individual. This is because the doctrine 
limits law enforcement officials from even being sued civilly.  
Qualified immunity also undermines ICERD provisions that 
speak to reforming laws that have the effect of perpetuating racial 
discrimination. It perpetuates racist conduct by law enforcement officials 
because the standards for overcoming qualified immunity are so difficult 
to meet.  
Likewise, the qualified immunity doctrine undermines 
international norms as it limits proceedings that are not criminal in nature 
and disregards the importance of civil proceedings. 
If rejectionism by the United States’ highest court continues, 
the treatymaking process stands to lose more than mere participation; it 
stands to lose weight and credibility. Future promises by the State will 
lack credibility, making it increasingly difficult to recapture the 
investment made as a ratifying State. Further, rejectionist practices will 
continue to encourage a system where State domestic courts do not have 
to enforce provisions of treaties that the State itself ratified. Further, 
RUDs in these treaties enable judicial rejectionism, relieves the judiciary 
from accountability, and endorses a branch of government’s ability to 
create law that undermines international law. This article adds a new 
dimension to that debate by examining how the United States’ highest 
court carries out rejectionist policy through the continual use of the 
qualified immunity doctrine, something seemingly domestic and far 
removed from international law and policy. Consequently, qualified 
immunity carries much more broad and far-reaching implications to the 
State’s ability to ratify international treaties and a State judiciary’s ability 
to undermine said treaties.  
The future of treaty making is ultimately left in the hands of the 
United States and its allies. Reforming RUDs to not limit treaties’ 
domestic effects within the State court system and instilling within the 
State greater and more principled acceptance of international legal norms 
has the ability to help lead a reoriented effort that sustain treatymaking’s 
values. 
